This article examines the growing importance of Facebook as a location-focused platform. Facebook's approach has been cautious but deliberate. However, following the strategic acquisitions of location-sharing start-ups Gowalla and Glancee, Facebook has ramped up its location-based services: they launched their Nearby feature in December 2012, and adjusted their application programming interface (API) in early 2013 to enable 'seamless' location-sharing across third party applications. These, and more recent acquisitions, are part of ambitious, longer-term moves that reposition Facebook as a local recommendation service (taking on Foursquare and Yelp), and, significantly, establish Facebook as a key local, and increasingly mobile-centred, advertising portal (taking on Google).
Introduction
A location service only gets interesting when you get to a certain scale. (Josh Williams quoted in Constine, 2012e) Then Williams dropped a bomb. 'Now we're seeing 250 million of our users tagging location on a monthly basis -a bit over 800 location tags per second.' (Constine, 2012e) This article examines the growing significance of location and geocoded data to Facebook. In it, I take a political economy of the media and platform studies approach and argue that the global significance of Facebook is amplified significantly when it is conceived of as a location platform. Despite an extensive critical literature on Facebook (Caers, et al., 2013) , little attention has been paid to date to how Facebook might, and I argue ought to be, understood as a location platform. While much of the attention on location-based services has been directed to the likes of Foursquare and Google, Facebook has quietly gone about building the necessary infrastructure in order to extract meaningful location data. Of particular concern for Facebook has been to strengthen its position as a mobile location-based social networking (and advertising) service.
In August 2010, it launched its mobile only service, Facebook Places. The following year, this was phased out and replaced by other location features, most notably an optin location button that tags each post with general location data. Facebook's approach has been a cautious but deliberate one, aimed at getting users accustomed to location sharing prior to 'monetizing' this data. However, following the strategic acquisitions of location-sharing start-ups Gowalla and Glancee, as well as photo-sharing site Instagram (and, later still, the messaging service, WhatsApp), Facebook significantly ramped up its location-based services: the company adjusted their API in early 2012 to enable 'seamless' location-sharing across third party applications, and, in December 2012, they launched their Nearby feature. These are all part of ambitious, longer-term moves that reposition Facebook in three ways: first, they establish Facebook as a location-based services company; second, they refocus the company as a local recommendation service (taking on the likes of Foursquare, Yelp, and Groupon); and, third, they establish Facebook as a key local and mobile advertising portal (taking on Google). The portrait that results of Facebook's initiatives to better integrate location and improve its mobile operations is that of a company now with extensive geodemographic profiling capacities, a strengthened position in local and mobile advertising, and an expanding corporate sphere of influence.
This examination of Facebook's growing interest in location and geocoded data is informed by prior work within mobile media scholarship which documents the complicated cultural economies of mobile phones (Goggin, 2006) and locative media (Farman, 2012; De Souza e Silva and Frith, 2012; Gordon and De Souza e Silva, 2011) , as well as that which calls for attention to be paid to the infrastructures that enable and support mobile communications (Horst, 2013) . Furthermore, in providing a detailed account of Facebook as company and social media service, I also engage with established work on the political economy of new media (Mansell, 2004; Van Couvering, 2011) as well as more recent work within platform studies (Van Dijck, José van Dijck (2012: 172) terms the 'politico-economic project' of attending to the 'technicity of platforms' and their business models. Thus, in detailing Facebook's internal initiatives and corporate acquisitions, I seek to develop, in Gerlitz and Helmond's (2013: 2) words, 'a platform critique that is sensitive to [Facebook's] technical infrastructure whilst giving attention to the social and economic implications of the platform'. In the final section of the article, I examine the larger implications of Facebook's pivot towards location and mobiles, drawing on and engaging with Mark Andrejevic's (2007) concept of the 'digital enclosure'. While Andrejevic developed this concept on the cusp of the emergence and wider take-up of smartphones, it nonetheless provides a productive theoretical framework for considering Facebook's recent corporate acquisitions and its geocoded data ambitions.
This article draws on an extensive search of the technology trade press and related sites in the US. Since the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), reliable corporate data is notoriously difficult to obtain and trade papers remain a crucial resource for scholarly researchers interested in the political economic dimensions of networked media and parallel fields (Sinclair, 2005) , and the everyday representation of them. As van Dijck and Poell (2013: 2) point out, while 'the underlying principles, tactics, and strategies' of social media platforms and firms 'may be relatively simple to identify', it is, however, 'much harder to map the complex connections between platforms' and the business decisions and internal company directives underpinning these connections and other economic arrangements. In the present content, a critical analysis of trade sources thus provides insight into Facebook's evolving engagement with location and related issues over time, as well as enabling a desirable continuity of data collection (a diachronic as opposed to a synchronic perspective). In addition, these sources make possible an examination of the narratives and other discursive strategies that are being used to shape location-based social media platforms like Facebook. This article is significant as the first to build a comprehensive account that demonstrates the strategic consolidation of location and ubiquitous mobile computing by Facebook.
Prior to exploring Facebook's strategic interest in location, however, it is important to, first, take a step back by tracing the rise of location as a key aspect of mobile phone use.
The Rise of Location-based Mobile Media and Geocoded Data Extraction
While consumer embrace of location-based mobile services is comparatively recent, the use of cell phones as positioning technologies is well established. For example, in the pre-smartphone era of mobile communications, there were 'broadly three ways of locating a handset or other user equipment with cellular networks' (Goggin, 2006: 195) : the first 'takes advantage of the cellular radio design, which allows the user's handset to be identified as being within a particular cell ' (196) ; the second involves 'measuring the time taken from signals from the handset to two or more network base station transmitters ' (196) ; and the third is GPS, which permits the 'calculation of position based on propagation delays of different transmissions ' (196) .
Since the arrival of the smartphone, end-user location can be determined with much greater accuracy via the above means, through wi-fi networks (De Souza e Silva, 2013: 117) , and as a result of 3G and 4G networks (Goggin, 2006: 195-197 (Zickuhr, 2013) . This, in turn, has led to end-user location and location-based services becoming 'of intense interest to the cell phone, wireless, and mobiles industries' (Goggin, 2006: 196) , as well as the advertisers and marketers, and the major players of the technology industry, such as Facebook. The reason is simple: smartphones 'gather unprecedented amounts of longitudinal data on their users' locations -data which can support new kinds of tailored retail and consumer services, lifestyle profiling and mapping, and surveillance, with considerable privacy and social implications' (Wilken and Goggin, 2014: 6 (Barreneche, 2012b) . In Facebook's case, it 'harnesses its social graph' to collect an array of different forms of 'local/location data' (Barreneche, 2012a: 335 ).
Facebook's larger aims for location information, in the words of one company spokesperson, are, ultimately, to shift end-user thinking away from conceiving of location as 'being a specific type of information people broadcast via their mobile phones, to metadata that you could add to any experience in your life' (Mangla, 2012) . How the company is working towards achieving this goal of 'location as metadata' is examined in the sections that follow, detailing Facebook's own internal developments (Places, Nearby), as well as key strategic corporate acquisitions to strengthen its position as a location-based mobile social networking platform.
Facebook Places
By Mark Zuckerberg's own admission, Facebook has been a relative latecomer to location and mobile location. By the time it launched its first significant location offerings in 2010, other major players, such as Twitter and Google, had already integrated location into their operations (Bilton, 2010) . In addition to Google and Twitter, a suite of specialist location-based mobile social networking start-ups had also emerged, including Loopt (founded in 2005), Whrrl, Brightkite, and Gowalla (all The result, Facebook Places, was eventually unveiled in August, 2010. There were two aspects to this new location feature. The first, a mobile only service, allowed Facebook users to check-in via smartphone to specific locations and to share each check-in with friends. The decision to launch a mobile only feature was likely driven by acknowledgment that most competing location-based check-in services were mobile driven, and in recognition of the fact that, as of 2010, Facebook had '200 million people around the world [who were] actively using Facebook from a phone', a number that had tripled from the previous year and was only likely to continue growing (Tseng, 2010) . With this in mind, Facebook tried to sell Places to its users via its blog with the pitch that 'life happens in real time, and so should sharing', including the sharing of specific locations (Tseng, 2010) .
Further Places refinements soon followed. A 'starred friends list' was added, which was a way of tagging those friends a user frequently checked in with. A Places Editor app was also tested that enabled users to correct location or venue information and categorize this information (Constine 2011a) . Facebook also sweetened the Places service for both its end and business users by introducing Deals (Tseng, 2010) , offers that users could share with friends nearby (Fougner, 2011) . Deals was initially launched in the USA, and subsequently expanded the following year to include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK (Fougner, 2011) . Deals formed a key addition to Facebook's location offerings: while Facebook claimed in 2009 that any location service it might develop would not compete with Foursquare, Loopt, or Gowalla, with Deals it was clearly beginning to stake out the same turf as two other competitors, Yelp and Groupon.
The second aspect to the Places feature was Facebook's decision to open up its place editing API (application programming interface) and geocoding service to a limited number of third-party developers. Significantly, this permitted the ability for a select list of 'intrepid developers (including Foursquare, Gowalla and Loopt) to develop interesting location-based services on top of Facebook' (Lardinois, 2010) . It was a particularly canny move on Facebook's part. As a company without first mover advantage in the area of geo services, opening up its API enabled it to gain access to and aggregate location data generated through other applications. Thus, its places database grew exponentially.
Even more powerful was the addition of single sign-on to its mobile app (Tseng, 2010) . Otherwise known as Facebook Connect, this service gives smaller sites the option of allowing their users to sign in via their Facebook account (Bilton, 2010) .
The attraction for users is that it simplifies authentication processes, and enables them to '"connect" their Facebook identity, friends, and [apply their Facebook] privacy
[settings] to any site' (Morin, 2008) ; interactions that occur on these other sites will then also appear on their Facebook page. The attraction for businesses is access to 'the precious user data connected to the platform', including, with certain permissions, users' location information (Hijleh, 2012) -information which marketers tend to view as highly prized. There are also obvious benefits of single sign-on for Facebook. Given that the announcement of single sign-on for mobile made explicit mention of Loopt, Yelp, and Groupon, among other apps (Tseng, 2010) , one clear benefit would appear to be granting Facebook access to a large pool of geocoded data, much greater than Facebook's users would generate via the Facebook app alone. Reflecting on one description of single sign-on as 'like a virtual passport', Nancy Baym (2011) asks whether 'we really want to think of Facebook as a nation', and to question the implications of what it means for 'Facebook citizenship to become a requirement for accessing other domains'. Facebook's appeal to the concept of the nation in selling single sign-on is telling insofar as this feature of its interface evokes another concept from political theory: that of the 'sphere of influence' which, in its loosest sense, is used 'to denote any territory in which a foreign power sought to exert exclusive influence without annexation' (Moore, c1963: 165) . When applied to Facebook's business dealings, this is precisely what single sign-on is designed to achieve: a means of exerting influence over how web-based information is accessed in order to gain privileged access to the data -including geocoded data -that restricted access yields.
By August 2011, only one year after its launch, Facebook Places was discontinued.
Jessi Hempel makes reference to Facebook's 'three steps forward one step back launch approach' where the company launches a product in order to test the waters, then pulls back before rolling it out again more slowly (cited in Mark Zuckerberg: Inside Facebook, 2013) . As this remark suggests, the discontinuation of Places by no means signalled a diminished interest in location and geodata on Facebook's part. On the contrary, at the same time that it was 'killing Facebook Places', the company was 'adding a lot more location features' (Protalinski, 2011a) , and revamping its privacy settings in order to accommodate them (Constine, 2011b) . Facebook also enabled location check-ins for its desktop users (rather than limiting it to mobile only functionality), and permitted opt-in location-tagging of all Facebook content (status updates, photos, Wall posts, and so on) (Protalinski, 2011a) . The above are all key steps in Facebook's vision of location as metadata, where 'location isn't just a node in the graph, but information that could be part of all content' (Tseng quoted in Constine, 2010) , a 'layer' (Constine, 2012b) sitting over the top of everything.
It is possible to interpret these developments in a number of ways. The move by Facebook away from a mobile-only location service could well have been driven by awareness that, while mobile internet use was growing, it still represented a smaller proportion of wider internet use. For instance, in 2010, of the overall proportion of the US population who accessed the internet (79 per cent), 29 per cent did so via a cell phone (Zickuhr, 2013) . Second, it is also possible that take-up was slow, and that Facebook's mobile users were reluctant to geotag content. By expanding locationtagging capabilities to desktop users, Facebook was able to target a much larger proportion of its overall user base and, in the process, habituate users to the practice of geotagging content (Protalinski, 2011a) . Third, by no longer restricting location tagging to the present, and widening this capability to include the past (such as geotagging old photos) and the future (such as sharing tips with friends regarding future events), Facebook had the potential to expand significantly the pool of usergenerated geocoded data.
In this interim period, Facebook engineers also worked on a new way of presenting check-in data: the 'timeline map'. This required back-end work building a 'global places directory', along with data-fetching capabilities and aggregation algorithms, in order to achieve accurate location pins on a map, as well as systems to enable users to retroactively geotag their content in order for it to appear on the timeline (Mangla, 2012) . In order to realise their ambition of the 'timeline map' constituting 'a single source for people to display the places they've visited', the Facebook engineers also released a series of location-related APIs that opened up access to third-party developers (beyond the select few of Loopt, Foursquare, Gowalla, and so on). These included APIs for 'read, write, and search'. In the case of the first of these, the read APIs, with permission, 'will allow any application that a person is interacting with to access the places that that person and their friends have visited' (Mangla, 2012) .
Moreover, as Constine (2012b) (Mangla, 2012) .
While in the third case, search APIs were upgraded 'to allow applications to access universal search requests so they don't need to build their own location search capabilities' (Mangla, 2012) . For Constine (2012b Constine ( , 2012c , these developments reposition Facebook as a 'hub for location data', a 'backbone' that can carry extensive social interaction and wide geofunctionality, and represent a further significant scaling of their location ambitions and further extends their sphere of influence in the field of location-based services.
Facebook Nearby
The next major step in Facebook's engagement with location only took one year, and came with the launch of Nearby for iPhone and Android in December 2012. Why Nearby is important, and how it differs from Places, is revealed by understanding three key, strategic corporate acquisitions Facebook made.
The first of these was the purchase of Texas-based Gowalla in December 2011 for an undisclosed sum. Gowalla was an early location-based mobile social networking service which was understood to have lost significant ground to its New York-based rival Foursquare (Protalinski, 2011b) , making it a prime candidate for acquisition.
Facebook's interest in acquiring Gowalla was not the service itself, which it closed within months. Rather, the key motivation for buying it was gaining access to the expertise of its staff, many of whom, including co-founders Josh Williams and Scott Raymond, relocated to Palo Alto, California, to work on further building Facebook's location services (Protalinski, 2011b) .
The second key acquisition was Instagram. In early April 2012, two months after filing its own IPO paperwork but still not yet a publicly listed company, Facebook purchased the popular mobile photo-sharing site, Instagram, for US$1bil (Constine and Cutler, 2012) . A week before this purchase, Instagram itself had closed a financing round worth around US$50mil (Tsotsis, 2012c) . The price Facebook paid for Instagram was considered high, even by Silicon Valley standards. According to one rather blunt industry assessment, the reason Facebook was prepared to shell out so much for the company was clear: 'Facebook was scared shitless and knew that for the first time in its life it arguably had a competitor that could not only eat its lunch, but also destroy its future prospects' (Malik, 2012) . This, it was suggested, was due to the fact that Instagram not only had a passionate userbase ('People like Facebook.
People use Facebook. People love Instagram'), but, more crucially, because 'Facebook is essentially about photos, and Instagram had found and attacked Facebook's achilles heel -mobile photo sharing' (Malik, 2012) . Instagram, in short, had 'cracked the code where Facebook itself failed: viral growth on mobile' (Malik, 2012) .
The third key acquisition was Facebook's purchase in May 2012 of Glancee for an undisclosed sum (Tsotsis, 2012a) . Glancee was one of a number of 'second generation' location start-ups known as 'ambient social location' or 'social search' applications (Lee, 2013: 27-28) . Glancee tracks a user's location in the background, links to Facebook and Twitter accounts, shows 'people who are using the app and their shared social graph interests and Facebook picture' (Burns, 2012) , and includes a 'radar' function to reveal their physical proximity (Lee, 2013: 27) .
Facebook's purchase of Glancee was also principally a 'talent acquisition'. The application was shut down, and Glancee's three co-founders, Andrea Vaccari, Alberto Tretti, and Gabriel Grise, all joined Facebook. Labeled 'a nice-guy ambient social location app for normal people' (Eldon, 2012) , this acquisition was viewed at the time as a good fit between Glancee's 'ideas and founders' and Facebook's 'mainstream user base' (Tsotsis, 2012a) . 2 As a 'talent acquisition', Facebook would have had reason to be pleased. Vaccari, for instance, was formerly at Google Maps, as well as MIT's Senseable City Lab, where he worked on a number of high profile data visualisation projects and co-authored articles on, among other things, engagements with urban space and place as determined from the aggregation of mobile phone activity log data (Girardin, Vaccari, Gerber, et al., 2009 The eventual fruit of this harvest of new talent was Nearby. Described as Facebook's 'first attempt at local business discovery' and search (Constine, 2012d) , Nearby provides a 'relevancy-sorted list of businesses and landmarks' that Facebook thinks each user will be interested in, based on a ranking process that takes into account 'friends who've Liked a business, checked in, left a short text recommendation, or given the Place a star rating' (Constine, 2012d) . Each business listing contains category, location, and rating information, and the ability to leave personal tips (Constine, 2012d) .
Crucial to Facebook's longer-term vision for Nearby was the release of In introducing Photo Maps, Instagram CEO Kevin Systrom's larger ambition for geocoded visual data was clear: 'We eventually want 100% of photos to be geotagged' (Tsotsis, 2012b) . Furthermore, he viewed photos not just as a searchable commodity, but as a mechanism for conducting searches, whereby those interacting with Instagram were 'using location the same way [one would] explore via hashtags or via a profile' (Tsotsis, 2012b) . What was left unspoken yet was apparent in these statements was that there were clear longer term commercial benefits for Instagram and its parent company Facebook in geocoding pictorial data (Constine, 2012a) , and it was inevitable that Instagram's datastream would feed into Facebook's -a move signalled by pre-emptive changes in December 2012 to its privacy policy to accommodate future integration (Crook, 2012) .
Here it is also worth noting Facebook's USD$19 billion purchase in early 2014 of mobile messaging client, WhatsApp. A key attraction of this deal was gaining access to WhatsApp's 450 million active users (72 per cent of whom are active each day) (Evans, 2014) . Further motivation for purchasing the service, it has been suggested, José van Dijck and Thomas Poell (2013: 9) make the point that, as platforms mature, they turn 'more into data firms deriving their business models from their ability to harvest and repurpose data'. It is the richness of the 'audience traffic' that is facilitated by the platform that forms the 'core, saleable asset' for the owners of the platform (Van Couvering, 2011: 198) . And, the more users -and user-generated data -a platform can claim, the higher the advertising rates (Fuchs, 2012: 144) .
Ongoing alterations to Facebook's APIs and mobile and desktop interfaces to incorporate location-awareness are significant as part of these user-focused datamining efforts. Facebook's various place APIs and its advertising arm serve as key gateways to the platform's 'audience traffic'. Both are vital instruments 'enabling the capitalization' (Lapenta, 2011: 22) Andrejevic's (2007: 298) words, 'architects of recentralization'.
Facebook has been able to achieve this through talent acquisition and extending its corporate 'sphere of influence'. The introduction of 'single sign-on', for instance, has provided greater access to and exploitation of resources (in this case, the extraction of rich geocoded user data pulled into its places database).
Mark Andrejevic (2007) 'free' Wi-Fi service to any business in the US that wishes to use it (Hajela, 2013) .
Bearing the rather awkward title of 'Connected Mobile Experiences (CMX) for Facebook Wi-Fi', the arrangement was that merchants would use their own existing router and broadband subscription, which then integrates with the CMX software .
Of course, the notion of 'free' Wi-Fi is a misnomer. As Robert Gehl (2013: 230) notes, 'Facebook's business model is based on trading access to the social graph for personal data'. The only difference here is that what is being traded for personal data is access to the social graph and the internet. In exchange for each business signing up to the service, Facebook 'provides the merchant with the aggregate ages, genders, and other demographic info of those who check in, but in an anonymized format without names attached' . For its part, Facebook is able to create an incentive for its mobile users to register their location which it can then scrape, as well as providing, along with Facebook Connect, another means of potentially reducing its subscription churn rate (Gehl, 2013: 225) . Furthermore, Facebook can encourage more businesses to sign-up as a 'prelude to buying ads' (Tate, 2012) , thereby extending the reach of its Nearby local search and recommendation and Deals services.
As Andrejevic (2007: 299) 'geodemographic profiling': data aggregation practices that use 'the data-mining of records of location trails to produce the socio-spatial patterns that make up the segmentations that enable inferences about users' identity and behaviour' (Barreneche, 2012a: 339) . Not only is geodemographic profiling reconfiguring how we understand and interact with places in potentially troubling ways ('the POI ontology mirrors the worldview of neoliberal urban politics of privatization and disappearance of public space' -Barreneche, 2012b), the addition of geodata to other forms of demographic profiling raises a number of privacy concerns pertaining to the types of user-data that are used by Facebook for advertising purposes, and what forms of protections, if any, users can expect from these forms of participatory economic surveillance (Fuchs, 2012: 141; Dwyer, 2014) .
Conclusion
This article has examined the variety of ways that Facebook has cautiously but deliberately gone about building geolocation and mobile functionality into the In this context, critical analysis offers the opportunity to engage with a range of critical issues, especially such as strategies for the extraction, retention, and 
